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This paper compares the welfare under two standard alternative exchange rate regimes, ﬁxed and
ﬂexible, in a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium two-country setting. Conventional wisdom
holds that countries often prefer low exchange-rate variability to stabilize trade. This may explain
the observed ‘fear of ﬂoating’ in emerging markets — although most of them claim to adopt a ﬂexible
system, in reality they often intervene to peg. We show that under incomplete capital markets a
ﬁxed exchange rate regime unambiguously increases trade and improves welfare. This provides a
potential explanation for the observed exchange rate policies in emerging markets.
Keywords: Optimal exchange rates
JEL Classification:F 3 ,F 41I n t r o d u c t i o n
I nt h ed e b a t eo v e rt h em e r i t so fﬁxed versus ﬂoating exchange rates, the professional opinion
has never remained ﬁxed. At the time of Bretton Woods (1944), the architects of the postwar
system favored ﬁxed rates, as it was considered that the ﬂexible rates were partly to be blamed
for the economic instability during the interwar period. However by 1960s, most of the economists
advocated a return to ﬂexible rates, due to the widening U.S. balance-of-payments disequilibrium
that eventually led to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. In 1980s, ﬁxed exchange-
rates were back in vogue again, as a credible way to achieving monetary stability, especially in
high-inﬂation developing countries. Finally, the ﬁnancial crises in Mexico (1994-95), East Asia
(1997-98), Russia (1998), and Brazil (1999) swung the opinion back to favoring ﬂexible exchange-
rates, as ﬁxed exchange rates were held to be the prime culprits in creating moral hazards in these
insuﬃciently regulated ﬁnancial markets.
There clearly seems to be a divergence of views between the international ﬁnancial institutions
(such as the IMF) and the emerging markets policy makers. The evidence points out that a
majority of emerging market countries opt for ﬁxed exchange-rate systems, even though they claim
to follow a ﬂoating regime1, perhaps in order to remain in the good books of the international aid
agencies. For developing countries, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) ﬁnd that the exchange rate variation
in comparison with their money supply, interest rates, and even terms of trade is too small to justify
their oﬃcial claims. They conclude that there seems to be a widespread ‘fear of ﬂoating’ among
these countries due to a lack of monetary policy credibility associated with a ﬂoating system, and
also due to their large foreign currency denominated liabilities.
Yet, recently the debate has taken a new turn. Some researchers have claimed that the countries
are (or should be) opting for corner solutions2. A key proponent of the bipolar view, Stanley
Fischer3 further qualiﬁes this argument:
1See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000)
2See for instance Eichengreen (1994,98) and Frankel et. al. (2000)
3See Fischer (2001)
1To put the point graphically, if exchange rate arrangements lie along a line connecting hard pegs like currency
unions, currency boards, and dollarization on the left, with free ﬂoating on the right, the intent of the bipolar view is
not to rule out everything but the two corners, but rather pronounce as unsustainable segment of that line representing
a variety of soft pegging exchange rate arrangements.
While a consensus is generally emerging that ‘no single currency regime is right for all countries
at all times’4, the basic underlying arguments to evaluate the alternatives remain the same. In all
recent ﬁnancial crises episodes, a common feature has been a large currency mismatch between the
assets and liabilities of the private sector. It is well known that emerging market countries often
encourage foreign currency borrowings through insuring currency risk by a commitment to ﬁxed
exchange rates. Calvo and Reinhart (2000), argue that the mismatch between domestic currency
assets and dollar denominated liabilities is the main rationale behind the prevalent ‘fear-of-ﬂoating’
in emerging markets. Both in the traditional and the current on-going debate over ﬂexible versus
ﬁxed exchange-rate systems, the latter is argued, inter alia, to stabilize and improve international
trade and investment. On the other hand, it is also argued that with free capital mobility the
agents should be able to hedge their currency risks which weakens the case for ﬁxed exchange rates.
Surprisingly, however, the open economy literature has yet to provide theoretical underpinnings to
these widely accepted arguments in an optimizing and dynamic general-equilibrium framework.
In this paper, we attempt to ﬁll this gap by evaluating both trade and welfare under alter-
native exchange-rate systems in a standard neoclassical framework under various capital-market
structures. In particular, we focus on the issue of cu r r e n c ym i s m a t c hb e t w e e na s s e t sa n dl i a b i l i t i e s
of the private sector. We ﬁnd that when the agents have hedging opportunities through trade in
nominal bonds, a ﬂexible exchange-rate system is welfare-superior to a ﬁxed exchange-rate system.
Under the former, both trade and consumption variabilities are smaller. On the other hand, with
incomplete markets, a ﬁxed exchange-rate system unambiguously increases trade in intermediate
goods, and it is strictly welfare improving under fairly general conditions. More interestingly, we
also ﬁnd that the countries may ﬁnd it optimal to ‘manage-ﬂoat’ under certain circumstances.
4See Frankel (1999)
2Speciﬁcally, we show that there is a threshold level of uncertainty, in terms of the variance of the
monetary innovations, beyond which both countries may ﬁnd the ﬁxed exchange-rate system to be
welfare improving. Finally, with some restrictions on capital markets such as trade in only single
currency nominal bonds, the initial conditions may be the key to an evaluation of the alternative
systems. In particular, each may be superior to the other, depending on the inter-country initial
level (and composition) of nominal claims. Again, the level of uncertainty turns out to be crucial
to the choice of a system.
To address these issues, we present a two-country stochastic general equilibrium model with
optimizing representative households. The countries freely trade both in intermediate and ﬁnal
goods. While the trade in ﬁnal (consumption) good takes place in spot markets, trade in inter-
mediate goods is through bilateral credit and is contracted one period in advance of the payment.
Money is needed for transactions; both for purchasing consumption goods in spot markets as well
as for making payments for input trade. While spot consumption purchases are done with do-
mestic currency, trade payments are made in the seller currency. This, essentially, is the source
of currency-risk in our model, since agents earn cash revenues in domestic currency, whereas the
payments for the input purchase need to be made in foreign currency. Further, these decisions are
made before monetary uncertainty is realized. We model uncertainty by assuming jointly symmet-
ric stochastic processes for money growth innovations, where a ﬁxed exchange-rate system amounts
to an assumption that they are perfectly correlated5.
In our benchmark model with complete markets, we show that the evaluation of an optimal
regime is irrelevant, as in the resulting Arrow-Debreu equilibrium the allocations are Pareto opti-
mal. Then we introduce market incompleteness in stages by ﬁrst allowing trade in nominal bonds
denominated in each country’s currency, then in only one currency, and ﬁnally by completely re-
stricting international trade in bonds. In all these cases, the real eﬀects are obtained primarily
through two channels. First, through the supply side as exchange rate risk creates home-bias in
input use, which distorts the eﬃcient allocation of resources. Second, through consumption variabil-
5More generally, one can think of these innovations representing both money supply and money demand shocks.
3ity that arises from the nominal denomination of international claims. With incomplete markets,
ﬁxed exchange rate system hedges currency risk, which obtains an eﬃcient input allocation. On
the other hand, ﬁxed exchange rates reduce diversiﬁcation opportunities available to households by
perfectly correlating the returns on nominal bonds. Henceforth, results essentially depend on the
existing level of ﬁnancial development in terms of market completeness.
The traditional models that employ welfare metric for policy evaluation, such as Helpman
and Razin (1979) and Helpman (1981), ﬁnd that ﬂexible exchange rate system is preferred to a
ﬁxed exchange rate system. However, these models introduce uncertainty through a one-time level
shock, and therefore, abstract from stochastic environments. In Helpman and Razin (1982) where
a stochastic environment is explicitly modeled in a two period optimizing framework, uncertain
money shocks create a precautionary motive for holding money6. Using dynamic general equilibrium
models under stochastic environments Stockman (1980) and Svensson (1984) analyze exchange rate
determination with incomplete markets and ﬁnd that the monetary policy has real eﬀects, but they
do not delve into the welfare evaluation of diﬀerent exchange-rate systems. Enders and Lapan
(1982) show that the expected utility is higher in the ﬁxed exchange-rate system. However, there is
a built-in asymmetry in their model; international capital is allowed to ﬂow only in ﬁxed exchange-
rate system.
Similarly, sticky-price ‘new open economy macroeconomics’ models such as in Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1995), Corsetti and Pesenti (1997), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998), and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2000) mainly address the international transmission of monetary shocks and its welfare impact, but
do not evaluate alternative exchange-rate systems. Finally, pricing-to-market models by Devereux
and Engel (1999) and Betts and Devereux (2000), who explicitly evaluate welfare under alternative
exchange-rate systems broadly ﬁnd ﬂoating rates to be preferable. In the same framework, Bac-
chetta and van Wincoop (2000) ﬁnd that trade is unaﬀected by the exchange-rate system and, in
general, both trade and welfare can be higher under either exchange-rate system.
6This motive is essentially created by an asymmetric treatment of currency and bond markets. Our approach
clearly diﬀers from theirs, as in our model money is only used for transactions.
4In section 2, we present our model and analyze the equilibrium allocations under complete
markets. In section 3, the same analysis is carried out under two cases of market incompleteness:
(a) with nominal bonds in both currencies and (b) with nominal bonds only in Home currency.
Section 4 completely shuts oﬀ international trade in bonds. In section 5, we oﬀer some conclusions.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a world consisting of two countries: Home and Foreign. Each country has an inﬁnitely
lived representative household with identical preferences over a homogeneous consumption good
that is produced in both countries. In particular, at any instant t t h eH o m eh o u s e h o l dm a x i m i z e s





where β is the discount factor, and Et is an expectation operator conditional on the information
available at t. Foreign’s objective is similarly described. In what follows, we will usually work with
variables and equations for Home that will be analogous for Foreign. To economize on notation,
we will diﬀerentiate Foreign quantities and Foreign currency prices by using an asterisk.
Both Home and Foreign households have identical technologies to produce the consumption









; α + γ ≤ 1 (2)
where θ is a productivity constant, and yH and yF are two production inputs. Home and For-
eign are endowed uniquely with input types H and F in the amounts of y and y∗ respectively.
From households’ utility functions and production technologies it is implied that the inputs will be
completely used. Hence, yH + yH∗ = y, and yF + yF∗ = y∗.
Both Home and Foreign households face a cash-in-advance constraint to purchase consumption
good. In addition, they also need to pay in cash for the purchase of inputs. There is complete
mobility in the goods market; each household can procure inputs as well as consumption good in
5both markets at seller-currency prices. As is standard in these type of models, we assume that each
household consists of a worker-shopper pair.
The event sequence runs as follows. In the beginning of each period, the worker and the
shopper meet and pool their resources together. The resources consist of their country speciﬁc
input endowments, and the nominal money balances carried overnight from the previous day’s
sales proceeds. Each household ﬁrst chooses the allocations of the Home and Foreign inputs. The
key assumption of our model is that these trades are made on credit and each household pays in
cash during the next period at the pre-contracted seller-currency prices. Further, cash transactions
are made between shoppers after markets open. Next, the worker and the shopper separate and the
markets for consumption good, currency and loans open. The shopper pays (receives) last period’s
import (export) cash dues, decides the quantity of nominal assets to carry for the next period, and
visits sale centers to purchase consumption good. The worker produces and sells the ﬁnal good
for cash at the home-currency market price. At the end of the day, the household gets together,
consumes its purchases and keeps money balances overnight.
Before the day begins, each country’s government provides a random lump-sum monetary trans-
fer Γ (Γ∗) to the Home (Foreign) household. In the aggregate, these transfers are made as random
fractions x and x∗ of their existing money supplies. We denote Home’s aggregate money supply
carried from period t − 1 to t as Mt.T h u s , i n p e r i o d t it evolves as Mt+1 =( 1+xt)Mt.W e
assume that the distribution of x and x∗ is i.i.d. and jointly symmetric7, with a correlation less
than one. Under a ﬂexible exchange-rate system, money supplies are generally diﬀerent. A ﬁxed
exchange-rate system will require that the correlation be one, that is xt = x∗
t for all t.
Home’s combined budget and cash-in-advance constraint in any period is given by
Nt + Γt + Zt − St Z∗
t + Bt − qtBt+1 ≥ PtcH
t + St P∗
t cF
t (3)
7By assuming symmetric money growth rates we rule out any asymmetric inﬂationary eﬀects on the supply side
such as in Stockman (1981).







and the household accumulates money balances as sales proceeds
Nt+1 = PtYt (5)
PH and PF∗ are pre-determined seller-currency prices of H and F type inputs respectively. Al-
though these equilibrium input prices are contracted at the time of delivery, the payments are made
in subsequent period. Similarly, P and P∗ represent the ﬁnal good prices in Home and Foreign
currency. Further, for Home (Foreign) yH∗ and yF denote quantities of H and F input export
(import) and import (export) respectively. The households can freely trade in one period nominal
bonds denominated in Home currency8.T h u s ,B represents the household’s nominal asset holding.
Notice that Home consumption has two components: (i) purchased from Home (cH) and (ii) from
Foreign (cF).F i n a l l y ,S denotes the nominal exchange rate as number of Home currency units per
unit of Foreign currency.
An equilibrium with complete goods market mobility implies that Pt = St P∗
t . Hence, (3) can
be rewritten as
Nt + Γt + Zt − St Z∗
t + Bt − qtBt+1 ≥ Ptct (6)
where c (= cH + cF) denotes total Home consumption.
Since the money supplies are assumed to have a trend, it is convenient to convert all time t
nominal variables as a fraction of the aggregate money supply carried forward from time t−1 to t























8In subsequent analysis we expand the set of nominal assets available for international trade. The restriction, at
this stage, is only for expositional convenience.
7Since individual and aggregate money balances are equal (Nt = Mt), in equilibrium mt =1
∀ t. Similarly, m∗,p ∗,p F∗,z∗,b ∗, and τ∗ denote Foreign counterparts. With these variables, the
consolidated budget and cash-in-advance constraint (6) becomes
mt + τt + zt − et z∗
t + bt − qt(1 + xt)bt+1 ≥ ptct (8)
Using (7), the normalized export and import payments (4), and the nominal money balances carried












Each period the household’s choice involves allocating inputs for production and choosing a
level of consumption and nominal assets, given its current nominal balances and asset holdings.
Home’s optimal choices are made by maximizing its discounted lifetime utility (1) subject to its





























where the operator Et obtains conditional statistical expectation based on the information available
at t.
The ﬁrst order condition (11) has the standard interpretation. The marginal utility of consump-
tion sacriﬁced by saving a unit of nominal balances in the current period is equal to its expected
8next-period marginal value discounted for the household’s impatience. Given the Cobb-Douglas
production function, (12) states that the share of home input income (or its opportunity cost) in
nominal GDP is equal to its share parameter α. Finally, (13) states that, in terms of next-period
expected marginal utility, the share of Foreign currency import expenditure in Home’s nominal




































t = γ (16)
Therefore, the equilibrium allocations will be determined by the budget constraints and the
above ﬁrst order conditions. In equilibrium, as St = Pt
P∗
t , it is clear that et =
pt
p∗
t . Further, as in



































































































9With the given technology, if α+γ<1, it is easy to show that the combined Home and Foreign












But, in general, with incomplete markets the input allocation rules (19) and (20) will not lead to
an eﬃcient allocation as in (21). This ineﬃciency can create opportunities for welfare improvement
and, hence, a role for policy intervention. This will be the focus of our analysis in subsequent
sections.
2.1 Equilibrium allocations with complete markets
As a benchmark, we will begin our comparative analysis of the two exchange-rate systems un-
der complete markets. Speciﬁcally, let us assume that the households can write state-contingent
debt contracts. Let Xt = {xt,x ∗
t} and let Xt = {X1,......Xt}. Formally, Home budget constraint
(inclusive of the cash-in-advance constraint) then becomes
m(Xt−1)+τ(xt)+z(Xt−1) − e(Xt) z∗(Xt−1)+b(Xt−1,X t)−
P
Xt+1
q(Xt,X t+1)(1+xt)b(Xt,X t+1) ≥ p(Xt)c(Xt)
(22)
Notice that the debt payoﬀs are contingent only on the realization of monetary shocks. We assume
that
β




< 1 for any realization of the monetary shock x. Hence, the cash-in-advance
constraint always binds. The households’ ﬁrst order conditions with respect to their input choices
(12), (13), (15), and (16) remain the same. With state-contingent debt markets the ﬁrst order















Here we have again made use of the fact that pt = et p∗







10This is an expected result: with complete markets, Home and Foreign households are fully able to
share monetary risk and smoothen their consumption. Let c∗
c = κ (a constant). Thus, in every
possible state of nature Home and Foreign share of consumption in the total output is constant.
ct =
















However, the above result does not ensure an eﬃcient resource allocation as in (21) if α + γ<1
(although (26) is a suﬃcient condition for eﬃcient production if α+γ =1 ), which is possible if and
only if yH = yH∗ =
y
2 and yF = yF∗ =
y∗
2 . In appendix (6.1) we show that complete risk sharing
implies eﬃcient production allocations as in(21). Hence, with complete markets








Thus, Home and Foreign (constant level of) consumption is given as in (25), where κ would be
determined by the initial level of wealth and the input ratio parameters of production function.
Hence, with complete markets the ﬁrst-best (Pareto optimal) allocation is achieved.
Clearly, in this set-up the choice of an exchange-rate regime is irrelevant as both systems would
lead to the same ﬁrst-best outcome.
3 Alternative Exchange-Rate Systems under Incomplete Markets
For an exchange-rate regime to be non-neutral, we need situations where households face currency
risk on their cross-currency assets and liabilities. In this section, we ﬁrst consider a set-up where
nominal bonds in both Home and Foreign currency are freely traded. We analyze this case with
both ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rates. Next, we evaluate welfare under the two alternative systems,
when only Home currency bonds are internationally traded.
113.1 Case I: Home and Foreign Currency Bonds
With nominal bonds in both currencies, the Home household’s budget constraint (8) is
mt + τt + zt − et z∗
t + bH
t + et bF
t − qt(1 + xt)bH
t+1 − et q∗
t(1 + x∗
t)bF
t+1 ≥ ptct (28)
where bH and bF now denote the Home holdings of Home and Foreign bonds, with prices q and
q∗ respectively. Again, Home and Foreign households’ ﬁrst order conditions with respect to input
choices (12), (13), (15), and (16) still hold. In addition the two nominal bond markets give rise to







































































































Equation (32) states that the ratios of marginal productivities of inputs (both H and F )i n
Home and Foreign output are inversely related with their respective gross interest rates (given that





yF∗ ) respectively). Intuitively, this relationship can be interpreted as follows: for the Home
household selling a unit of Home input obtains PH units of Home currency at the beginning of
12next period, whereas using it in Home production earns P αY
yH units of Home currency (that will be
available only during next period). In equilibrium, therefore, PH = P αY
yH . On the other hand, the
Foreign household has to pay PH units of Home currency in the next period to obtain a unit of H
input, which is equivalent to qPH in the current period. However, it can earn P∗ αY ∗
yH∗ in Foreign
currency (again to be available for use during next period). It’s equivalent to q∗P∗ αY ∗
yH∗ units of
Foreign currency in the current period, which in Home currency is equal to Sq ∗P∗ αY ∗
yH∗ .A g a i n ,i n
equilibrium qPH = q∗P αY ∗
yH∗ (as P = SP∗). This implies the ﬁrst equality in (32) while a similar
argument for the use of F input yields the latter.
Further, in appendix (6.2) we show that in equilibrium both nominal bonds oﬀer the same
nominal interest rates
qt = q∗
t ∀ t (33)
and that the households completely diversify their next period assets and liabilities
bH + z = bF − z∗ ∀ t (34)
Intuitively, the equality of bond prices (33) can be interpreted as follows. We found that the
ratio of bond prices determines the allocation of inputs into Home and Foreign production. Suppose
that in any period t, qt >q ∗
t (then Yt >Y∗
t ). In turn, this implies that the value of a unit of Home
currency during the next period is relatively more valuable than a unit of Foreign currency. Since
money supply shocks are symmetrically distributed, this also implies that the Foreign output is
expected to be smaller (Y ∗
t+1 <Y ∗
t and Yt+1 >Y t), which can only happen if the relative bond






t . Continuing in this manner, this is only possible
if agents expect that limt−>∞ q∗
t =0 .T h e n limt−>∞ Y ∗
t =0 . But given the technology ((2) and
if α + γ<1), this means that the marginal product of a unit each of the two inputs (together)
in Foreign production will be inﬁnitely large relative to that of Home. Hence, this can not be
an equilibrium. Therefore, a rational expectations equilibrium requires that the qt = q∗
t ∀ t. The
equality of bond prices directly implies that Home and Foreign output are equal








13Hence, we ﬁnd that an eﬃcient input allocation is obtained as in (21), which maximizes combined
Home and Foreign output.
The second result in (34) has a standard portfolio diversiﬁcation interpretation. Given a choice
of nominal assets with return uncertainty in terms of their real value, the household holds an
optimally diversiﬁe dp o r t f o l i o . L e tu sa s s u m et h a ta ta n ym o m e n tt, Home household is a net
lender. It is found that Home is long in both nominal assets. While it already has a long position
in Home currency due to its export credit on H input, it has a short position on the import credit
on F input. Therefore it acquires a higher long position in Foreign bonds relative to Home bonds
to optimally diversify its asset portfolio. Further given that qt = q∗
t ∀ t, this portfolio consists of
equal fractions (let this portfolio fraction be lt = bH
t + zt = bF
t − z∗
t) of claims over each country’s

























+ qt(2lt+1 − α + γ) (36)
Finally, using the ﬁrst order conditions (29) and (30), the equilibrium bond prices and bond holdings











































+ qt+1(2lt+2 − α + γ)
⎤
⎦ (38)
with l0 as given.
Thus, we have shown that a free trade in cross-currency nominal bonds leads to an eﬃcient
resource allocation for production. Further, although households still face the risk related with
14monetary uncertainty which makes the returns on their bond holdings uncertain, they are able
to completely hedge their cross-currency risk by trading in and holding equal amounts of the two
nominal bonds.
Having analyzed the equilibrium with ﬂexible exchange rates, let us now look at the equilibrium
outcome under the alternative system.
3.1.1 Equilibrium under Fixed Exchange Rates
The exchange rate is ﬁxed by perfectly correlating the monetary shocks of Home and Foreign so
that x = x∗. To see this, ﬁrst notice that with two nominal bonds, the bond prices are equal as we
discussed above9. As before, it directly implies that the input allocations will be eﬃcient and that
Home and Foreign outputs will be equal (Y = Y ∗). Hence, if the cash-in-advance constraint binds
(which we assume), clearly Home and Foreign prices grow at the same rate. Thus the exchange
rate, S = P
P∗ is constant. In the other direction, let us assume that the nominal exchange rate
is ﬁxed at S = P
P∗ = ¯ S. Then it follows that if x = x∗, the peg can be indeﬁnitely maintained.
In this case the normalized prices are p = p∗. From input allocation rules (19) and (20), then
yH = yH∗ =
y
2 and yF = yF∗ =
y∗
2 , which implies that Y = Y ∗ ∀ t.















+ qt(lft+1 − α + γ) (40)
where lf denotes the total nominal assets held by Home10. It is easy to see that while the input-
output allocations remain the same, the households, on the other hand, loose the beneﬁt of portfolio
diversiﬁcation as obtained under a ﬂexible exchange rate by holding two imperfectly correlated
nominal bonds. The increase in the variance of the asset portfolio (for any given initial asset level)
9However, an arbitrage argument also now leads to the same conculsion. To rule out inﬁnite proﬁt opportunities,
in an equilibrium the nominal bond prices will be equal, so that q = q
∗.
10The currency denomination is irrelevant, as has been discussed above.
15under a ﬁxed exchange rate is equivalent to an ex-ante decrease in welfare for both Home and
Foreign. Thus, a peg is strictly welfare reducing for both countries, when both Home and Foreign
currency nominal bonds are available.



















(1 + xt+1) − 2lft+1 + qt+1(2lft+2 − α + γ)
¸
(42)
with l0 as given11.
3.2 Case II: Only Home Bonds
When only Home nominal bonds are internationally traded, the households’ combined budget and
cash-in-advance constraints, and Home and Foreign ﬁrst order conditions are given as in (8), (10),
(11), (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16). The resulting input allocations between Home and Foreign
production are as described in (19) and (20). Under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, the input






















































































































11One can see that the equilibrium bond prices will be lower under ﬁxed exchange rates since the return variability
will be higher.
16Therefore, to analyze input allocations, it is necessary to look at the consumption equations
and determine how they covary with the Home and Foreign consumption good prices. For Home



























We will consider three special cases here. (a) Home holdings of its own bonds (bH
t ) is positive.
(b) bH
t is negative and equal to −zt, i.e. it hedges the currency risk ac q u i r e db yt h ee x p o r tc r e d i t .
(c) bH
t is negative and equal to −(zt + z∗
t), i.e. Home is a net borrower. However, it has diversiﬁed
liabilities, both in Home and Foreign currency as a fraction z∗
t of their respective money supplies.
We reiterate that with cash-in-advacne constraint binding, the commodity prices pt and p∗
t
are given as 1+x
Yt and 1+x∗
Y ∗
t respectively. Let us, for the moment, assume that Y ' Y ∗12.T h i s










. Then, the input allocations are
mainly determined by the covariance terms in (44).
Case (a): bH
t > 0 When Home has positive bond holdings (bH
t ), it is obvious from (45) that a
high realization of xt (and thus pt) relative to x∗
t will make Home poorer and the Home would cut
both on its current consumption as well as the next-period nominal asset holdings. Thus, pt and
ct are negatively correlated and hence the covariance term in the numerator of the ﬁrst equation
in (44) is negative. On the other hand, from (46) it is implied that the impact on c∗
t is just the
opposite. Hence, the covariance term in the denominator of the second equation in (44) is positive.
Similarly, we can argue that a relatively higher realization of x∗
t(and thus p∗
t) will yield a positive
covariance term in the denominator of the ﬁrst equation and a negative covariance term in the
numerator of the second equation in (44). If the eﬀects are approximately symmetric, we expect a
12Of course, Y and Y
∗ are equibrium outcomes. Although Home and Foreign outputs change because of changes
in input allocations, if the home-bias is approximately symmetric (as we show), then the eﬀect on the ratio
Y
Y ∗ is of
a second order.
17symmetric home-bias of use of inputs in Home and Foreign production13.
Case (b): bH
t = −zt When Home holds a negative level of its own currency assets such as to
hedge against its export credit claims over Foreign, it is clear from (45) that realizations of xt are
relatively less important than that of x∗
t. In fact, the covariance terms in the numerator of the ﬁrst
equation and in the denominator of the second equation in (44) may turn out to be very small. In
this case, however, the realizations of x∗
t would still play its role and would result in a similar bias
as discussed in case (a). Clearly, the bias will be smaller.
Case (c): bH
t + zt = −z∗
t When bH
t + zt = −z∗
t, home has a diversiﬁed debt portfolio. Changes
in xt and x∗
t aﬀect Home and Foreign current wealth symmetrically. Hence, we can argue that
both covariance terms in the ﬁrst equation of (44) would be positive whereas both in the second
will be negative. It is easy to see that this equilibrium is equivalent to the case with two nominal
bonds under ﬂexible exchange rates, where the initial conditions (by assumption) are such that, in
equilibrium, Home buys zero level of Foreign bonds. As discussed before, there is no home bias in
input use in this case.
Case (d): bH
t +zt < −z∗
t Continuing this argument, we can say that when bH
t +zt < −z∗
t, there
can be a situation where instead of home-bias, we may actually have a foreign-bias in input use.
3.2.1 Equilibrium under Fixed Exchange Rates
We argued above that the home-bias of input use will depend upon initial nominal bond holdings.
It can range from a very high home-bias to even an anti-home bias. Let us turn our attention to
the situation under ﬁxed exchange rates.
Suppose the money supplies of the two countries are perfectly correlated (x = x∗) and the
agents expect the exchange rate to remain pegged at S = ¯ S (say =1 ) . Notice that with ﬁxed
13However, a Home decrease (increase) in the next period real return on assets due to a bad/good relization of
(x,x
∗) will also aﬀect future input allocations and thus decrease (increase) home bias, and change next period’s Home
and Foreign output. But, as assumed, the eﬀect on the ratio
Y
Y ∗ is of a second order and the conclusion will still be
valid.
18exchange rates two-bond economy is equivalent to a one-bond economy and hence the outcome
will be similar to the one obtained in the previous section. The rational expectations equilibrium
output of the two countries will be equal, i.e. Y = Y ∗ and the equilibrium can again be described
by (39), (40), (41), and (42).
We can now see that a relative welfare evaluation of the two exchange rate systems will depend
on the initial nominal debt holdings of Home bonds. If the economy is in case (a) under ﬂexible
exchange rates, then a ﬁxed exchange rate system may be welfare improving with a higher combined
Home and Foreign output. On the other hand, if Home is already diversiﬁed in its debt holdings
as in case (c), a peg may be welfare reducing for both countries14.
4 Incomplete Markets: No International Trade in Bonds
In our analysis under incomplete markets with only one nominal bond, we have implicitly assume
that an eﬃcient allocation of inputs will improve the welfare of both countries, which will generally
hold if the two countries are symmetric in their inputs, i.e. α = γ. There, the welfare comparison
of the two exchange rate systems basically boils down to evaluating the trade oﬀ between the costs
and the beneﬁts of eﬃcient input allocation and portfolio diversiﬁcation15. However, even if a ﬁxed
exchange rate system allocates resources eﬃciently, it may not be able to achieve a Pareto optimal
outcome, which requires that the welfare of both countries strictly increase16.
In this section, we assume that while the households can freely borrow and lend domestically,
cross-border lending is not permitted. Hence, while the Home household carries cross-currency
assets and liabilities through exports (Home currency assets/investments) and imports (Foreign
currency negative assets/Foreign investment), it is not able to hedge it through nominal asset
holdings. In equilibrium, it is obvious that bt = bt+1 =0 . In all that follows, we assume that the
14An explicit welfare evaluation will also have to take other parameters of the model such as the input shares α and
γ into account. However, we conjecture that these results will hold under fairly general conditions, such as α = γ.
15An explicit evaluation under general conditions will be very complicated and beyond the scope of this paper
16Although we do not deal with this issue here, it is obviously important from the point of view of the implemen-
tation of an exchange rate system.







This implies certain restrictions on the distribution of the money growth rate x and the discount
factor β. For β<1, it can be shown that a suﬃciently high value of the mean relative to the
standard deviation of x will ensure that (47) holds.
With (8) holding with equality, using equilibrium prices (17) and the fact that net supply of
bonds, bt = bt+1 =0 , Home and Foreign consumption are























Notice that Home and Foreign consumption depend on the current period Home and Foreign
outputs, and export payments and import receipts. zt
1+xtYt denotes the real value of Home (Foreign)





t denotes the real value of Home (Foreign) import
(export) payments(receipts). As zt and z∗
t are pre-determined, their current real values depend on
the currency prices in terms of consumption goods.
In appendix (6.3) we show that the equilibrium input allocation is stationary17. Henceforth, we
suppress time subscripts, and use unconditional expectation operator E instead of Et.

























From (48) and (49) we notice that Home consumption (c) is inversely related to its money growth
rate while directly related with that of Foreign. Since E(XZ)=E(X)E(Z)+Cov(X,Z),i ti s




yH∗/Y ∗ > 1 and
yF/Y





yF∗/Y ∗ 6=1 . It is clear that with ﬂexible exchange rates there is a home-bias in
production as the countries choose a higher proportion of their own inputs. Since input trade gives
rise to consumption variability through uncertain currency liabilities in real terms, each country
prefers to use more of the input that it is endowed with.
Having characterized optimal input allocations and trade under ﬂexible exchange rates, we
now proceed to analyze household welfare under alternative exchange-rate systems. We ﬁnd that
when the countries are symmetric in relation to their input share in production technology, a ﬁxed
exchange-rate system is strictly welfare improving. However, when the share parameters α and
γ are not equal, we have to resort to numerical computations to show our qualitative results.
Therefore to build intuition, at ﬁrst, we will work with an extremely asymmetric case where only
Home endowment is used in production.
4.1 Only Home Input Used in Production: γ =0
Here, the technology is described by
Y = θ(yH)α (51)
The budget constraints of Home and Foreign reduce to
m + τ + pH yH∗ ≥pc ;













Again, notice that Home and Foreign consumption depend on the current period Home and Foreign
outputs, and the real value of import credit due in the current period,
pHyH∗
1+x Y .H o m ea n dF o r e i g n



























easy to see that for eﬃcient resource utilization k =1 . Thus, k is a measure of home-bias; smaller
k implies that Foreign imports less input from Home than the eﬃcient level. From (12), (15), and


























Using (56), (55), and (54) we can evaluate (1) as the welfare in a ﬂexible exchange-rate system.
4.1.1 Trade and Welfare under Fixed Exchange Rates
Next we examine this set-up with ﬁxed exchange rates. It is easy to see from (55) that when money
growth shocks are perfectly correlated, i.e. x = x∗, home-bias is eliminated as k =1 . Therefore,







Intuitively, there are two underlying factors that obtain eﬃcient allocation of inputs between
Home and Foreign production in switching from a ﬂexible to a ﬁxed exchange-rate system. Consider
Foreign’s choice of import each period. By importing a unit of input, Foreign household earns its
marginal revenue in its own currency whereas the marginal cost it incurs is in Home currency.
Hence, there is clearly a currency risk involved in this transaction, that reﬂects in the equilibrium






while under ﬁxed exchange rates pH = 2α
y . A lower price in terms of Home money implies a higher
than eﬃcient (yH =
y
2) level of input use by Home, so as to equalize marginal revenue from its
own production versus selling it to Foreign. Hence, there is a home-bias in input use18.W i t hﬁxed
exchange rates, as both Home and Foreign revenues and liabilities have same currency denomination
and hence, once the friction related with currency risk is removed, eﬃcient allocation is obtained.















Notice that although the combined Home and Foreign output is maximized, both still face con-
sumption risk through monetary uncertainty. Its real value in terms of consumption good is Y α
1+x,
which is dependent on the current money growth shock. Hence, although ﬁxed exchange rates
obtain production eﬃciency, the consumption uncertainty still remains.
Using (56) and (59), we can evaluate the welfare gain obtained by switching from ﬁxed to ﬂexible
exchange-rate system. As we can not obtain closed form solution for the ﬂexible exchange-rate case,
we resort to numerical evaluation.
4.1.2 Welfare Gains from Float to Peg: A Numerical Evaluation
Since it is not a calibration exercise, we only look at the qualitative behavior of our model using
plausible parameter values. We ﬁx the Home endowment y =1and the technology parameter
θ =1 . For computational convenience, we assume a simple two-state stochastic process where the
money growth rates can be either ‘high’ or ‘low’ with equal probability. It can be easily ensured
18This is essentially the underlying rationale behind home-bias of input use in all set-ups so far discussed. However,
with no nominal bond markets, this eﬀect is more clearly discernible.
23that the cash-in-advance constraint binds over a range of plausible parameter values for discount
rate β, technology parameter α, average growth rate ¯ x, and its standard deviation σ.S i n c e w e
conduct our exercise over a wide range of technology parameter α ∈ [0.05,0.95],w eﬁx the average
value of the growth rate ¯ x =0 .519 to ensure that the cash-in-advance always binds over its variance
σ ∈ (0,0.3). However, our main results hold through, even for smaller values of mean and variance
of monetary growth rates after restricting the range of plausible values for other parameters.
Below we present a panel of graphs that compare welfare gains obtained by Home and Foreign
by switching from ﬂexible to ﬁxed exchange-rate system. These gains are plotted against the level
of uncertainty in terms of the standard deviation of money growth distribution. We obtain the
plots for three diﬀerent values of α =0 .3,0.52, and 0.8.
Figure 1. Welfare Gains from Float to Peg
a=0.8























































19This may seem implausibly high but our purpose is to look at the qualitative results over a wide range of
parameter values.
24Clearly, these pictures indicate that a change in the exchange-rate system aﬀects Home and
Foreign asymmetrically. For low values of α, while it is optimal for the exporting country to switch
from a ﬂoating system to a peg; it is welfare reducing for Foreign. On the other extreme, for high
values of α the situation is reversed. Further, welfare gains depend on the variance of monetary
growth distribution. For both low and high values of α, an increase in variance enhances the welfare
gain eﬀect. However, for intermediate values the response becomes non-monotonic.
To interpret these results, notice that Home consumes, in addition to its own output, the ﬁnal
consumption good that it imports in lieu of the credit it extends to Foreign. The real value of
the credit depends both on the distribution (which reﬂects in the pre-contracted equilibrium price,
i.e. the terms of trade) and the current realization of money growth shocks. Similarly, Foreign’s
consumption is its own output net of its import credit liabilities towards Home.
In switching from a ﬂexible to a ﬁxed exchange-rate system, ﬁrst, there is an output eﬀect
that equilibrates input trade at the eﬃcient level such that aggregate output is maximized20.I t
increases Foreign output while decreasing Home output. Second, there is a terms of trade eﬀect
which improves for Home in switching from a ﬂoating exchange-rate system to a peg. Clearly, both
of these eﬀects are monotonic with respect to the variance of money growth shocks. Finally, there
is an additional third factor: the consumption variability related with the import credit. Compare
consumption allocations under ﬂexible (56) and ﬁxed (59) rates. Although under ﬁxed exchange
rates the terms of trade improve, and Home gets a larger transfer of ﬁnal goods from Foreign, it is
also implied that a larger part of both Home and Foreign consumption now becomes uncertain.
At lower values of input share parameter α, the allocation of productive input remains near
the eﬃcient level even under ﬂexible exchange rates. When the countries switch from a ﬂexible
to a ﬁxed exchange-rate system, the terms of trade (and also the export receipts of Home) eﬀect
dominates that of the individual output changes. Since Foreign is a net importer, its welfare is
lower than that under a ﬁxed system while Home’s welfare improves. For higher values of α input
20Under a ﬂexible exchange-rate system, Foreign imports a lower input amount implying a lower level of production,
while Home produces at a higher level.
25allocations fare relatively far from their eﬃcient levels under a ﬂexible system. Hence, country
output changes dominate that of the terms of trade eﬀect. For some intermediate values of α, the
two opposing eﬀects give rise to a non-monotonic response of welfare-gains the standard deviation
of the money growth rates as observed in the panel II of Figure 1.
One puzzling result is that the switch is never Pareto optimal; one country gains at the cost
of the other21. This is despite the fact that a ﬁxed exchange-rate system increases the combined
Home and Foreign output and, therefore, consumption. This is explained by the third factor: the
larger consumption variability under ﬁxed rates. A switch increases consumption variability of both
countries as a ratio of their mean consumption. This eﬀect remains dominant enough to rule out
any case (a pair of α and σ), where welfare of both countries could improve simultaneously.
4.2 Input Trade and Welfare with Two Factors
To analyze a situation where a switch from ﬂexible to ﬁxed exchange-rate system can be Pareto
optimal, we now turn our attention to the two-input general case. We ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h em o d e l
variables under a ﬁxed exchange rate and then compare them with allocations under ﬂexible rate.
4.2.1 Fixed Exchange Rates
As before, in a ﬁxed exchange-rate system the monetary growth rates of Home and Foreign are
perfectly correlated, i.e. x = x∗. Again, home-bias is completely eliminated and it is easily seen
that yH = yH∗ =
y
2,y F = y∗
F =
y∗









As before, even though the output is endogenously predetermined, the consumption is still
21It turns out that the combined welfare of the two countries, as a sum of their individual ex-ante utilities, improves
when the welfare improves for Foreign. This is simply due to the fact that Foreign’s consumption is lower. Any transfer
from Home to Foreign subject to the concavity of the welfare function drives this result.
26variable and depends on the realization of monetary shock in the current period.
4.2.2 Symmetric Inputs: α = γ
Let us look at a symmetric case i.e. where the two countries are similar in their endowments, i.e.
α = γ. With ﬁxed exchange rates we have perfect risk sharing




However, with ﬂexible exchange rates consumption is variable


































It is obvious from equilibrium prices (17) and consumption (61) that ω<1. Further, Home and
Foreign outputs are equal









Moreover, it is obvious that Yflex <Y fixed. Comparing consumption under the two systems we
can see that From (61) both countries enjoy a certain ﬁrst-best level of consumption under a












, is lower. Further, ex-ante utility will even lower as U (E (c)) >
E(U(c)).H e n c e ,aﬁxed exchange-rate system is strictly welfare-improving for both countries.
4.2.3 Asymmetric Input Shares: α 6= γ

















22As one would expect, with symmetric input shares, home-bias is also symmetric.

























































































Again, we resort to numerical computations to analyze our qualitative results.
4.2.4 Numerical Evaluation of Welfare Gains
We simulate our model for the parameter values of the previous exercise, and conduct our analysis
for various combinations of α and γ. To cover whole possible ranges of plausible variations between
the two parameters, we mainly consider two cases: α +γ =0 .3 and 0.6. Within both cases, we try
diﬀerent combinations of the two so as to contrast our results.
28Case I: α + γ =0 .3 The following graphs presents our results
Figure 2. Welfare Gains from Float to Peg :a+g =0 . 3
a=0.27 , g=0.03
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In section 4.1, where only one country is endowed with the productive input, we found that for
low values of α Home gains while Foreign suﬀers in a switch from a ﬂexible to ﬁxed exchange rates.
However, as we already know from section 4.2.2 that when both countries’ input share parameters
are equal, a switch is always optimal. By continuity, the same would hold for slightly dissimilar
values of α and γ. In Figure 2, panel I, we observe that both countries improve their welfare, even
when the diﬀerence is large enough. However, as the diﬀerence grows and Foreign input share gets
smaller, the terms of trade eﬀect increasingly becomes important. Hence, in panel III we observe
the same pattern as that with only one input. For some intermediate diﬀerential range as in panel
II, for Home the terms of trade eﬀect dominates at all variances, while Foreign’s welfare has a
non-monotonic response as the one observed for Foreign in panel II of Figure 1. As explained
before, this comes as a trade-oﬀ between worsened terms of trade and increased Foreign output.
29Next, we use higher values of input share parameters.
Case II: α + γ =0 .6 Figure 3 presents our results
Figure 3. Welfare Gains from Float to Peg :a+g =0 . 6
a=0.55 , g=0.05











































Again , as in section 4.2.4, we observe above in panel I that both countries’ welfare improve
even when the diﬀerence between α and γ is large enough. However, as the diﬀerence grows and
Foreign input share gets smaller, the reallocatoin of resources work asymmetrically and we observe
a similar pattern as in section 4.1, where only one country is endowed with the productive input.
In section 4.1, for large values of α,we found that Home suﬀers, while Foreign gains, in a switch
from a ﬂoating to ﬁxed exchange-rate system. Hence, in the last panel we observe the same pattern
as that with only one input. For some intermediate diﬀerential range as in panel II, Home’s welfare
gain is non-monotonically related to the variance of monetary shocks, which comes as a trade-oﬀ
between the improved terms of trade and a lower output as obtained in panel II of Figure 1 in
section 4.1. This is an interesting result: Home may ﬁnd it optimal to have a ﬂexible exchange-rate
30system, if the variance of monetary disturbances is small. For larger levels of uncertainty, it would
prefer ﬁxed rates. Thus we have a result where it is optimal for home to ‘dirty-ﬂoat’.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we attempt to provide a rationale for the ‘fear of ﬂoating’. By focussing mainly on the
issue of currency mismatch between private sector’s revenues and liabilities, it is shown that when
cross-currency transactions are made in uncertain monetary environments, trade is strictly higher
under a ﬁxed exchange-rate system. Furthermore, when markets are incomplete, it may be welfare
improving for all countries to opt for a ﬁxed exchange-rate system. However, when the countries are
asymmetric in terms of their input endowments, it may be possible that a change from a ﬂexible to
a ﬁxed exchange-rate system beneﬁts one country at the cost of the other. More interestingly, the
countries may ﬁnd it optimal to ‘manage-ﬂoat’ under certain circumstances. Speciﬁcally, we show
that there is a threshold level of uncertainty, in terms of the variance of the monetary innovations,
b e y o n dw h i c hb o t hc o u n t r i e sm a yﬁnd the ﬁxed exchange-rate system to be welfare improving.
On the other hand, when agents have hedging opportunities through trade in nominal bonds,
a ﬂexible exchange-rate system is welfare-superior to a ﬁxed exchange-rate system. Under the
former, both trade and consumption variabilities are smaller. Finally, with some restrictions on
capital markets such as trade in only single currency nominal bonds, the initial conditions may
be the key to an evaluation of the alternative systems. In particular, each may be superior to the
other, depending on the inter-country initial level (and composition) of nominal claims. Again, the
level of uncertainty turns out to be crucial to the choice of an exchange-rate system.
Often, developing countries hold debt issued by developed countries, while mutually extending
import credits. While developed countries generally leave their exchange rates to the market,
developing countries try to peg their exchange rates with that of the former. One conclusion of our
model is that the welfare impact of a peg is much higher for a developing country, especially if the
input shares in technology are large, and the developed country happens to be relatively richer in
capital inputs, which is an empirically plausible case. The empirical validity of this conclusion can
31be easily tested.
In our model, the main source of exchange-rate uncertainty is generated through import cred-
its. Alternatively, this can be modeled as cross-country investments whose returns are prone to
exchange-rate uncertainty. Although we have assumed that the transactions take place in seller-
currency, the analysis can be easily extended to cases where transactions take place in buyer-
currency, or all credit transactions take place in only one currency. Further, instead of exchange-
rate risk only distorting the supply side allocations, one can think of the uncertainty also aﬀecting
consumption allocations in a two-good consumption model. Last, but not the least, our framework
can also be employed for evaluating the alternative systems under real shocks. All these issues are
part of the agenda for our future research.
6 Appendix
6.1




yF∗ for all t. Using the equilibrium condition ptYt =1+xt,














































































Assuming that the cash-in-advance constraint always binds, and using the equilibrium conditions
for prices (17), exchange rates (18), and that the net supply Home and Foreign nominal bonds
bH
t + bH∗
t =0 , and bF
t + bF∗



























































































































































































































































































We call two functions f(xt+1,x ∗
t+1;Xt) and g(xt+1,x ∗
t+1;Xt) as distributionally equivalent (under




t+1;Xt) and vice versa. An observation of the expressions in (68) imply that all equal-
ities in (71) will hold if and only if, the functions p(Xt+1)c(Xt+1) and p(Xt+1)c∗(Xt+1) are
distributionally equivalent to p∗(Xt+1)c(Xt+1) and p∗(Xt+1)c∗(Xt+1) respectively, for all t and
Xt. This, in turn leads to the conclusion that all conditional expectations taken at time t are
symmetric with respect to the realizations of Xt+1, i.e. G(xt+1,x ∗
t+1;Xt) ≡ G(x∗
t+1,x t+1;Xt)
for all t and Xt. This further implies that two distributionally equivalent functions (such as
p(Xt+1)c(Xt+1) and p∗(Xt+1)c(Xt+1)) when multiplied with conditional expectations functions
(such as G(xt+1,x ∗
t+1;Xt)) form resulting functions that are also distributionally equivalent. Fur-
ther, if functions p(Xt+1)c(Xt+1) and p(Xt+1)c∗(Xt+1) are distributionally equivalent to p∗(Xt+1)c(Xt+1)
and p∗(Xt+1)c∗(Xt+1) respectively, then it can be shown that all expectation functions are sym-
metric in the current realizations of x and x∗. By observing the detailed expressions for these
functions as in (68), it is implied that the condition for distributions equivalence is met if and only
if
Y (Xt+1,Xt)=Y ∗(Xt+1,Xt) (72)
and
bH(Xt)+z(Xt)=bF(Xt) − z∗(Xt) ∀ Xt and t (73)
























In the other direction, if Home and Foreign output are equal as in (72) and that the equality of
nominal claims as in (73) holds, then from (31) the nominal bond prices are equal, i.e. q = q∗ ∀ t.
From (32) and (2) it is then implied that Y = Y ∗ ∀ t. Moreover, if q = q∗, then from the previous
discussion it is obvious that equality of nominal claims (73) also holds.
6.3







































































. Hence, it is implied
that yH
t = yH
t+1 = yH,y H∗
t = yH∗
t+1 = yH∗, yF
t = yF
t+1 = yF,a n dyF∗
t = yF∗
t+1 = yF∗. Hence,
Yt = Yt+1 = Y, and Y ∗
t = Y ∗
t+1 = Y ∗.
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